The history of the U.S. Space Program is filled with forks in the road. Places where a different decision could have led to a completely different future. One of the most crucial of these 'branch points,' occurred around the time that human beings first set foot upon the moon. Namely, what next?  Now that the Apollo program seemed so close to succeeding, the need for a follow on space policy seemed necessary.  Would this mostly political venture be terminated after fulfilling the wishes of its recently slain President?  Or would the program be expanded to include a trip to the other planets, and a permanent U.S. presence in space. The mood of the time seems best summed up in a memo to Dr. Robert R. Gilruth, Director Manned Spacecraft Center from George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight written in September of 1969.    

            'The end of the decade marks a year of decision for Manned Space Flight and for NASA. This month the Space Task Group transmitted its recommendations concerning space flight in the 1970ís to President Nixon...The Apollo program objective served our manned space flight capabilities and technology.  Now, however, a balanced program is needed which will provide for the sustained development and use of manned space flight over a period of years focused on an eventual manned planetary landing in the 1980ís. 

            Two major directions have been identified for the manned space flight programs.  The first is the further exploration of the moon, with possibly, the establishment of a lunar surface base; the second is the continued development of manned flight in earth orbit leading to a permanent manned space station supported by a low cost shuttle system, that will be accessible and useful for a wide range of scientific, engineering, and applications purposes. 

            Our endeavors to optimize the use of existing capabilities has led us to integrate the flight programs of astronomy, life sciences, space physics, advanced technology, and earth applications with the manned program of lunar exploration and the earth orbit space station to the maximum extent feasible. Further, I believe it is important that we do not gap either our lunar exploration or our earth orbital activities, and to this end, we are proposing concurrent activity in both areas with the following key milestones:    

The emphasis was on using existing capabilities to build a strong foundation for a long term space program.  The approach was an evolutionary one, using the experience and most of the hardware, with modifications and enhancements, to continue upon the evolutionary course begun with Project Mercury. Of course what actually happened was that one small piece of the project was selected, the orbital shuttle, and pursued at the expense of all other launch vehicles.  The decision made was therefore a revolutionary one, start with a new and untested design in areas of little or no knowledge, instead of an evolutionary design based upon experience with existing systems.  The result would of course be cost overruns and flight delays, and would leave America out of space flight for most of the 1970ís.  But in a greater sense this decision, away from an evolutionary course, has set a bad precedent with the shuttles replacement slated to be developed from new technologies making use of very little of the technical and operational experience of the Shuttle program. It would also interfere with the evolutionary path the United States Space Program was following, from Mercury to Gemini, to Apollo and from the X-15 to the X-24B, and leave the United States with no heavy lift vehicle, or reliable space transportation system. 

            But that was the way things happened, this paper will focus on what could have been.  What the U.S. Space Program could have been had the course of events followed more closely the program outlined by George Mueller and Max Faget in 1969. According to Max  Faget, Director of Engineering and Development, in a 'Space Base Program Memorandum' dated March 10, 1969, the post Apollo space program should consist of:

'1. a large Space Base (operational in the late 70ís) with an artificial G capability which is composed of a number of modules each launched on a two-stage Saturn (SIC-SII).

2. a Space Station (operational in the mid-70ís) that is the first element of the Space base and has an artificial G capability (using the terminal SII stage as a counterweight) but is operated in a zero G mode except for an initial period of artificial G engineering and operations assessment. 

3. an Intermediate Logistics System that is new, compatible with the first flight of the Space Station, and would be launched on either a Titan IIIM or an INT 20 (SIC-SIVB)

4. an Advanced Logistics System that would be a low cost, reusable shuttle which would service the Space Base and would have a fixed landing site.' 2

            All of these components relied on the past experience of the manned flight program. All but the advanced logistics system would be launched on 100% proven boosters, from the Saturn family.  The Space base and space station would be built from existing technology, as the Skylab station later was.  The intermediate logistics system, manned shuttle, would be either a modified Gemini or Apollo spacecraft, both well known systems, and the advanced logistics system would be based around the HL-10 lifting body which was the last in a long line of well tested and well known technologies.  In other words there would be almost no attempt to 'reinvent the wheel' or 'Go where no man has gone before.'  This would be a program based on proven technology and systems modified to perform different missions.  The program would be raised on the shoulders of its predecessors and make use of its predecessors technical and flight experience.

            The details of this evolutionary space program for the future was outlined in an Integrated Program of Space Utilization published in July of 1969. Had this plan been implemented instead of the shuttle program our present would be a very different place, and this paper may have been written from the moon.

            The integrated program attempted to synthesize the capabilities of the existing program and give a purpose and direction for the continued evolutionary growth of the manned space program. The report states that:

            'Only three vehicles will be used for all launches from earth--the two stage Saturn V-A, the space shuttle and small payload vehicles such as Scout...The SV-A would launch such items as space station modules, LM/Bís[Lunar Module/Base] nuclear vehicles, and sometimes propellants to utilize the vehicle payload capability.  The space shuttle will bring men, equipment, supplies, propellants, and automated satellites to orbit.  It will also perform some special missions such as satellite services by flying directly to the satellites.

            The low earth orbit space base will serve as the integration and initiation point for all cislunar operations.  It will be a major source of science, applications and technology undertakings, will serve as a propellant facility and a base for the LM/B space tug.  Space shuttles in orbit will use the base as a depot for embarking on special missions and satellite servicing.

            The space tug in low earth orbit will be used to inject escape payloads onto interplanetary trajectories, provide manned tending of automated spacecraft placement and retrieval.

            The nuclear shuttle will utilize the space base as a refueling and resupply depot.  It will provide round trip payloads to lunar orbit and geosynchronous orbits consisting of men, space station modules, LM/Bís, propellants for LM/Bís, equipment and supplies.  It will be the only transportation system between low earth orbit and lunar orbit or geosynchronous orbit.

            The geosynchronous orbit station will provide a facility for significant manned science, applications and technology endeavors.  The space tug operating with the geosynchronous station will allow man tending of automated spacecraft and spacecraft  placement and retrieval.

            The lunar orbital space station will serve as a mission operations base to the lunar surface.  It will conduct science, applications and technology research as well.  The LM/B will operate from this facility to the lunar surface and will shuttle men, equipment and supplies.  The LM/B will constitute the only transportation to the lunar surface and from the lunar surface.

            The lunar surface base will serve as an excellent facility for resources analyses and astronomy.  It can also be the base from which various lunar surface sites are explored.

            The stable of equipment necessary to perform an integrated space program thus consists of two expendable launch vehicles, SV-A and Scout, three reusable shuttle vehicles, the earth to orbit shuttle, the LM/B, and the nuclear shuttle, and one space station module.  A summary of these hardware modes of operation and uses is shown in figure 1.'3

            Figure1 is also important in that it shows the way the Space Shuttle and Saturn V would complement each other and take advantage of each programs individual strengths. It also shows how each phase of the mission, from the surface of the Earth to the surface of the Moon, used the same components enhanced and modified slightly to perform different tasks. 

figure 1

This evolutionary approach is illustrated even better in a chart entitled 'NASAís Next 16 Years: How the Programs Interlock,' from the September 1969 issue of Space/Aeronautics.  In this illustration, figure 2,  each of the existing technological programs, Apollo, the Apollo Command Service Module, Gemini, HL-10, X-24, Shuttle, NERVA,Saturn, and Titan 3 are listed down the y axis, while time is represented on the x axis. A line is drawn from each program to show how it will be modified and used in conjunction with other existing programs to build space stations, lunar bases, and eventual manned planetary missions. 

figure 2

            What is apparent from this chart is how small a role the shuttle was slated to take in this program, and how heavily it was to rely on the existing lifting body technology and design.  Another thing to note is the assumed use of the Saturn and Titan boosters until a low cost booster could be blended from the two. It would have been unfathomable in 1969, at the time this chart was published, to imagine that within ten years all of these programs and capabilities would be lost except for the Space Shuttle and the Titan booster. As is apparent from this chart the space shuttle was considered an advanced shuttle to used as a replacement for the interim shuttle which was to be a synthesized Apollo/Gemini spacecraft. 

The debate about the development of the logistics system went back to 1965 during Senate Hearings for the 1966 NASA Budget Authorization when the interim and advanced logistics systems were first described.  At the time the two approaches, modified Apollo Command Module, and HL-10 modified lifting body, were considered alternatives competing with each other.  Later the lifting body would be designated as the follow on to the interim Apollo design.

            Both approaches were outlined as follows. 'The first is based on minimum modification to the Apollo command and service modules.  In this approach, the personnel carrier is the Apollo command module, modified to permit storage at the laboratory.  Both the service pack and the cargo compartment would involve new developments. Logistics spacecraft could be docked at the laboratory, the cargo module separated, and the two parts rotated by mechanical linkages to parking positions outside the hangar-test area.  Accommodations for bulk cargo are built into a fixed array of liquid containers in the aft end of the cargo module.  The logistics spacecraft interior compartment design is similar to that of the laboratory so that it will have thermal and life support compatibility with the space station while it is docked.  The service pack is required for purposes of orbital de-boost on the return flight.  The cargo module could also be used for added shirtsleeve volume for conducting experiments while attached to the space station.  The second approach is that of a lifting system as illustrated in the right hand side of figure 251.  This would be a more advanced logistics vehicle and require greater development effort.  It could have an airport landing capability, side range maneuverability, and reusable construction.  In addition, lower accelerations would be experienced by the passengers so that the eventual manning of the space station by non-astronaut qualified scientific personnel could be more attractive. Some of the areas of tradeoffs which must be resolved before a selection of configuration can be made are listed in the lower portion of figure 3.'

figure 3

            Both six man and twelve man designs were conceived of for each system, as shown in figures 4. The evolutionary nature of the program is most visible in figures 21 and 22 which clearly show the progression of logistics vehicles from the Mercury and X-15 and the evolution of launch vehicles from the Redstone and Atlas.

figure 4

The way things could have, and for the purposes of this paper, should have happened is illustrated in figure 5 which clearly shows the natural progression expected for the manned spaceflight program and what each program was expected to accomplish.  From experimental earth orbital operations in the Gemini and Apollo program, an Apollo Applications program was intended to build upon previous experience and develop experience in low earth orbit activities.  Once these goals were met the results of the AA program would be used to build and service a space station from which a multitude of space research could be based, including extended lunar exploration, planetary exploration, meteorology, and other scientific research and development.  Through this program a Lunar Module Shelter/Taxi configuration would be tested. 'The AA program calls for dual Saturn V flights in 1971, 1972, and 1973 to the lunar surface.  One flight would carry an LM shelter which would have the ascent module removed, and which would contain living space, extra expendables, a lunar drill, and perhaps mobility vehicles. It would be joined within a few days by a second LM Taxi Configuration, carrying three astronauts, which would rendezvous with the LM shelter to allow a long duration stay of up to 28 days on the lunar surface.'5

figure 5

            These lunar taxis/bases were based upon existing equipment modified and enlarged to allow greater utilization.  The research and development costs were negligible, the technical experience with the equipment was high, and the capability of the technology was already proven.  All that was needed was a firm commitment, and a determination by NASA to remain on a growing evolutionary path.

The philosophy NASA had at the time towards manned spaceflight was markedly different than what it would become only a few years later.  At this time it was believed that 'during the past 6 years, the United States, in addition to carrying out many specific missions, has been engaged in creating a large, basic space capability.  This includes a versatile family of launch vehicles and spacecraft, and the trained manpower to continue to produce and use them.  Other things being equal, these capabilities, with the resultant gain in reliability, should be used to the maximum degree in future missions.  If such capabilities are not used they deteriorate.  Their use can achieve lower costs and greater assurance of success for many desirable future programs than can otherwise be achieved.'6

            The idea that long term use of existing capabilities would lead to an increase in efficiency and a decrease in cost seemed to have been forgotten once the Space Shuttle had been adopted as the 'do all,end all' space system.  In the mad scramble to prove the economic worth of a reusable space shuttle, the fact that modifications and improvements to existing technologies could be made that would greatly decrease the cost of space flight while maintaining proven reliability and continuing along an evolutionary path were ignored.  There were many such programs, but perhaps the most exciting, and therefore most tragic, was the possibility of making the Saturn heavy lift launch vehicle partly reusable. 'In terms of dollars spent, the reusable Saturn first stage would have an initial cost of about $25 million per copy.  Boeing predictions show that it would cost about 13% of that amount to recover and repair the stage, plus a labor cost of about 10% for repair and checkout.  Company spokesmen say the 23% total is an 'outside figure.  Itís our most pessimistic prediction.'  And they add that with the redesign of the S1C, rather than adaptation of the unit, the 13% part of the refurbishing cost would be pared to about 3-4% of the stageís original cost...The Rocketdyne F-1 engine used to power the S-1C has already been run for periods of more than 40 hours with no component failure or more than normal wear.  This is equal in time to some 960 flights.  Rocketdyneís H-1 engine, small relative of the F-1, was fired and dunked into the ocean several times by NASA in a test of its ability to be refurbished.  Each time it was washed off, checked out and repaired, and test-fired again.  Cost of the refurbishment was estimated at about 4% of the cost of a new engine.  Comparable figures have been projected for the F-1...They calculate that if just one booster was built and reused, it would have paid for itself by the third flight.'7

            In addition to the cost savings afforded by modification and reusability of existing equipment, it is necessary to note that the costs for the evolutionary approach with a space station and advanced lunar exploration were '...estimated by NASA to lie in the $4.5-$5.5 billion range.'8  About the same amount as was estimated for the development of a wholly new space transportation system known as the space shuttle.  And considering cost overruns and additional funding, which would probably have been needed regardless of which path had been followed, at the end of the day $5 billion in 1970 money would have bought at least some form of space station, continued lunar exploration, and created an infrastructure for continued evolutionary growth.  The path that was really followed has bought us a shuttle to nowhere, and created a dead end which must now be fixed through the development of the X-33 to do the job the shuttle was originally promised for.  It would appear that the decision made after Apollo to go ahead only with the Shuttle was an exercise in futility which has brought us, after almost thirty years, back to where we started with a call for a cheap reusable shuttle.  But in 1969 we had a 100% reliable heavy lift vehicle, a multitude of proven expendable and manned launch vehicle configurations, and an active lunar program.  It would appear that the path chosen after Apollo left us wandering in circles for 30 years trying to find our way back to the right road.  If we had instead chosen the other path, which I have outlined in this paper, we would by now have built upon the legacy of those early experimental programs. 

            The realization of what the space station program, encompassing extended lunar exploration, interim and advanced logistic vehicles, and the space tug, decision would mean for the Apollo program was not lost on everyone in 1969. Frank Leary, contributing editor to Space/Aeronautics  wrote an article about the space station in September of 1969 which said in part that:

            'In more ways than one, the space-station program represents a consolidation phase in manned spaceflight.  It should harrow and sow all the ground turned by Apollo.  The temptation to consolidate at the expense of forging ahead has been characterized by high level task groups as a danger. But a consolidation which integrates disparate technologies and plugs developmental and informational gaps should satisfy even the boldest spirits.'9 

            The consolidation phase Leary discussed never did occur. A destruction phase did though, which relegated the technological prowess developed during the Apollo era to museums and old timers reminisces.  The budding seedlings carefully cultivated during Apollo were fumigated to make room for the encroaching ivy of the shuttle program. And so the choice was made to do something risky and revolutionary instead of something dependable and evolutionary.  We are all aware of what the results of that decision was, I hope that after reading this paper you will have gained some insight into how things could have been had an alternate path been chosen.

1.Mueller, George E.  Memo to Dr. Robert R. Gilruth, Director Manned Spacecraft Center from Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight  Sep. 11, 1969

2.Faget, Maxime A. Space base program Memorandum  Mar. 10, 1969

3.Integrated Program of Space Utilization, July 16, 1969, pp. 3-11-12

4.1966 NASA Authorization,  p. 278

5.Space Daily, March 22, 1967, p.122

6.1966 NASA authorization, p.1033

7. Voss, Kurt  'Reusable Saturns May Mean 75% Savings' Technology Week; October 24, 1966 p. 37-38

8.Report of Space Task Group Staff Directorís Committee on NASAís Request for Amendments to the NASA FY 1970 Budget    March 14, 1969, p.3

9. Leary, Frank 'Man in Space Stations and bases'  Space/Aeronautics  Sept. 1969, p. 56